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Abstract— The concept named SocialStegDisc was introduced 
as an application of the original idea of StegHash method. This 
new kind of mass-storage was characterized by unlimited 
space. The design also attempted to improve the operation of 
StegHash by trade-off between memory requirements and 
computation time. Applying the mechanism of linked list 
provided the set of operations on files: creation, reading, 
deletion and modification. Features, limitations and 
opportunities were discussed. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
In an increasing number of scenarios of digital economy, 
security mechanisms in storage, modification or sharing of 
sensitive data require to be considered and applied. Most IT 
systems use external mass storage devices (not embedded 
directly in the processor) to store data of various sizes. 
Access to and management of their physical form is ensured 
by a filesystem.  
An external storage device, referred to as a drive, is 
deemed to be a safe drive when physical and software 
implementation of a given drive performs security services: 
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of data. The fourth 
desired feature of safe drives is hiding performance of basic 
operations in a filesystem. Steganography may be a way of 
hiding communication with drives or performance of drive 
operations. The purpose of steganography is to hide 
information in a carrier of this information in a way which is 
unnoticeable to the observer.  
Throughout the years, application of steganography in 
mass storage has evolved into a separate field of research 
referred to as File System Steganography. A milestone in 
this research area was the work of Anderson, Needham and 
Shamir [1]. They proposed a steganographic filesystem 
allowing to deny the existence of entire file directories. In 
general, steganographic filesystems are an application of 
steganography, therefore their development is often preceded 
by appearance of new steganographic techniques. This work 
is an example of such coupling. In 2016 a new type of a 
steganographic technique called StegHash was proposed in 
[2]. In this system, multimedia files placed in open social 
networks (OSNs) are a carrier of hidden information. The 
essence of the system is the existence of a logical connection 
between them by means of a mechanism of hashtags, that is 
text markers in the form of #<tag>, commonly applied in 
OSNs. In addition, the author of [2] proposes an option of 
applying the StegHash technique to create a steganographic 
filesystem analogous to the existing classic filesystems such 
as FAT (File Allocation Table) or NTFS (New Technology 
File System). This work focuses on extending this 
application of the StegHash method by proposing a new type 
of technique called SocialStegDisc. 
II. STATE OF THE ART 
A. Steganographic filesystems 
As mentioned above, a breakthrough in the development 
of steganographic filesystems is an article written by 
Anderson, Needham and Shamir [1]. The authors proposed a 
method utilizing the way in which invisible ink works. A 
user with a password is able to find and decode hidden 
information. The StegFS system presented in [3] is a 
practical implementation of the concept presented in [1] as 
an extension of a standard filesystem, Linux Ext2fs.  
In recent years, distributed filesystems used in clusters of 
various kinds have been gaining popularity. For such 
systems, proposals of applying steganography to hide 
information in them also appear, for instance in [4]. The 
main idea behind the method presented in [4] consists in 
using multiple files to encode hidden information by means 
of their relative positions in clusters.   
Among recent proposals, work presented in [5] is worth 
highlighting, in which Neuner et al. presented a way of 
hiding information in timestamps of files saved in classic 
filesystems. They discovered that information may be 
effectively hidden in 24 bits (3B) coding the nanosecond part 
of the timestamp in the NTFS filesystem. For each file, it is 
possible to use two types of timestamps: of creation and of 
last access. In this way, one file creates 6B of space for 
hidden data.  
B. Use of OSNs in steganography 
As soon as open social networks appeared, 
steganography researchers began searching for options to 
apply them in steganographic systems.  
In [6] the authors define two types of communication: 
with high and low entropy. In a high entropy model, 
multimedia files such as images, movies or music are data 
carriers. This is a classic example of multimedia 
steganography, where a single object carries hidden 
information. A covert channel of this type is characterized by 
high throughput but is easy to detect. A low entropy model 
consists in using text data to carry hidden information. In 
addition, information from such a hidden information carrier 
is decoded by means of a previously known method (secret). 
A hidden channel of this type is characterized by a low 
throughput but a good level of security. The authors also 
propose using such a channel to establish the location of the 
appropriate steganogram, and they indicate Internet services, 
for instance social networks, as a carrier. Proposals of low 
entropy steganographic methods are presented in [7]. The 
first one uses file names as a hidden information carrier and 
requires OSNs not to change them. For this method, the 
authors propose using standard file naming schemes by 
photographic devices. Sequence numbers in these names are 
a hidden data carrier. The second method assumes using tags 
in pictures. Numerous images with numerous users’ tags 
creates a hidden channel. On the basis of a prepared set of 
pictures and a set of tags, it is possible to develop a matrix 
encoding hidden information. Other approaches based on 
language features are presented in [8] and [9]. Steganograms 
are transferred as bitmaps coded by means of language 
permutation. The created channel is very safe but there is a 
high likelihood of its distortion.  
All these methods use a classic multimedia 
steganography, easy to detect, or a more sophisticated one, 
with a limited steganographic throughput. The proposed 
methods assume using multiple user accounts in OSNs and a 
parallel access to an abundance of files, which may be an 
insecurity indicator on the servers’ side and an operation 
blockage. 
III. CONCEPT OF THE SYSTEM 
There is a basic limitation to applying StegHash in 
SocialStegDisc: memory occupancy. Along with the increase 
of the number of n hashtags, the volume of the dictionary 
increases proportionately to n!. Therefore, keeping the entire 
dictionary in the memory places a heavy burden on the 
system, and generation of the dictionary and restoring the set 
of used addresses will consume a large amount of time. The 
main goal behind keeping these dictionaries is ensuring 
uniqueness and reliability of addressing. Therefore, for a 
higher n it is proposed to introduce a dynamic verification of 
uniqueness of the generated addresses. Two space-time 
tradeoff-type modifications will be formulated on its basis 
along with an application of the linked list mechanism. 
A. Dynamic verification of uniqueness of addresses 
The first attempt to increase the efficiency of the 
StegHash method is to eliminate storing results from 
generation of the utilized address space when creating a 
chain and later restoring it. Such a set was stored because it 
was necessary to verify the uniqueness of the generated 
addresses. In this proposal, uniqueness is verified by 
checking in the OSNs whether there is a file with a given 
address. 
B. Space-time tradeoff modifications and linked list 
mechanism  
From the perspective of a correct system operation, the 
system of addressing, that is indexing SocialStegDisc 
segments with hashtags, is of key importance. A 
characteristic feature of such addressing is non-linearity. 
Subsequent addresses are generated by means of a specific 
function on the basis of the initial address. The issue of 
addressing in SocialStegDisc is an analogy to the problem of 
memory space fragmentation in classic filesystems. Until 
now, a strong assumption was a prohibition of hiding 
addresses of the system due to security reasons. This implies 
that it is not possible to apply mechanisms servicing memory 
fragmentation, for instance allocation tables or storing the 
index to another memory block together with the data. As a 
consequence, it is not possible to make available a function 
of deleting single files because an occurrence of any gap in 
addressing, if it is not known that the gap exists, would mean 
that the files located after the gap would be lost. Under this 
approach, once a file is added to SocialStegDisc, it will 
remain there. In this article, a solution is proposed which 
would allow to introduce structures for efficient management 
of resources (addresses), known from classic filesystems, to 
SocialStegDisc. To this end, the assumption of non-storing 
the addresses will be weakened by introducing such a 
mechanism which will simultaneously not decrease the 
security level.  
Direct addresses to objects may be presented by means of 
an address to the object of reference (beginning of the 
SocialStegDisc instance) and a counter, whose value will 
serve to control obtaining the address of the subsequent 
object. In every multimedia object, space for this counter is 
added to hidden space. Due to this, the SocialStegDisc 
system assumes the structure of a linked list which allows to 
supplement the system with file deletion. An example of 
how this operates is presented in the figure below.  
 
Figure 1.  Mechanism of a linked list in SocialStegDisc 
Apart from hiding m bytes of proper data, it is necessary 
to place a minimum of p bits coding the numerical index in 
every multimedia object. The selection of the volume p 
determines the maximum length of the chain, for which the 
problem of information loss does not occur when the 
mechanism of file deletion is applied, and amounts to 2p - 1. 
The hidden counter will be used in proposed modifications 
of the space-time tradeoff type, by using it to control the 
functions establishing the next address. This counter may 
store:  
1) the address code for application of the StegHash 
method without the dictionary of used addresses; 
2) the counter value which specifies how many times 
the procedure of generation of a subsequent address 
should be performed to actually obtain it – in the 
case of elimination of both original dictionaries of 
the StegHash method. 
When StegHash with a modification eliminating the 
dictionary of used addresses is applied, when a chain of 
objects is created, a code of the address to the next object is 
placed in the additional space, in line with the coding from 
the dictionary of permutations. The scheme of this procedure 
is presented in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Creation of a chain by means of combined StegHash method 
and linked list mechanism 
During reading, the address code is retrieved from the 
hidden space and then converted into an address in the form 
of a set of hashtags. Thus, access to the next object is 
possible. To maintain the continuity of the address space, 
when deleting a file in the multimedia object preceding the 
beginning of the given file, the counter should be updated to 
the value retrieved from the last object storing the file to be 
deleted. The set of the used addresses should also be 
updated. The released addresses are not lost but they go back 
to the pool and may be generated in the subsequent iterations 
of pseudo-random generation function.  
Another proposed modification of space-time tradeoff 
type is a total elimination of original StegHash dictionaries 
and using the linked list mechanism to store relevant 
counters allowing to restore the chain. To this end, first of 
all, the algorithm of dynamic generation of addresses should 
be modified so that the function, apart from the new address, 
returns the current status of the sampling counter in the 
course of generation of subsequent addresses. With the 
starting point known, the obtained counter allows to retrieve 
the address returned in the course of generation at the 
counter status. As these states of the counter are recorded in 
the hidden space defined for the linked list mechanism, they 
allow to traverse the chain objects from a known initial 
address of the SocialStegDisc instance. In Figure 3, a scheme 
of a chain creation is presented. 
 
Figure 3.  Chain creation with no dictionaries and a linked list mechanism  
File deletion which entails creation of free address space, 
in this case updates the index in the object preceding the 
space to the value of the index from the last deleted file.  
IV. DISCUSSION 
The issue of addressing in SocialStegDisc is an analogy 
to the problem of memory space fragmentation in classic 
filesystems, which has been highlighted when developing the 
concept. The SocialStegDisc concept introduces a 
mechanism of storing indexes to the next object in the 
system, due to which the drive assumes the structure of a 
linked list. Thanks to the application of a linked list 
mechanism, it is possible to efficiently use the space and 
propose a file deletion mechanism. The greatest problem is 
the calculation overhead and algorithms verifying the 
correctness of the operation scheme.  
The system is characterized by non-linearity in filling in 
the byte space. This effect occurs when the last used object 
hides a smaller number of bytes than possible. On the basis 
of the number of bytes, it is possible to determine the length 
of the chain of multimedia files created in line with the 
StegHash technique essence. This size amounts to: 
  (1) 
where M is the number of bytes on which the operation is 
performer, and m is the size of a single logical block. When 
  in the last multimedia file in the chain, 
fewer bytes are placed than the size of space allocated in the 
multimedia file (m). 
The SocialStegDisc undetectability level depends on: 
1) the level of undetectability by open social networks 
of applied methods of multimedia steganography, 
serving to hide data;  
2) the level of undetectability of the StegHash 
steganographic method which is a system of 
indexing multimedia objects and building the 
SocialStegDisc drive space from single blocks;  
3) the level of security of social networks with respect 
to detection of anomalies in network users’ 
behaviour. The SocialStegDisc system may 
communicate with the same service multiple times 
at short intervals. From the perspective of such a 
service, frequent and automated sending of queries 
will be treated as a threat, for instance as an attack 
of a Denial-of-Service type; 
4) the level of detectability of multimedia 
steganography. This problem was under research 
for Facebook, among others. In [10], the authors 
tested algorithms sanitizing steganography on the 
side of Facebook servers. The research shows that 
Facebook algorithms are efficient in the detection 
of steganography known so far, in particular for 
hidden information of greater size.  
In [11], a way of evaluation of network steganography 
techniques was proposed in three categories of 
undetectability: good, bad and ugly. The presented 
classification manner may be applied to other steganographic 
methods. StegHash may be considered a good 
steganographic method, which transitively means that the 
proposed SocialStegDisc technique is also characterized by 
this feature. The observer is unable to detect the ongoing 
communication anywhere in the network, even at the 
receiver of hidden data.  
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Environment 
The system implementation proposal presented in this 
article is a proof-of-concept of the SocialStegDisc system. In 
Figure 4 a scheme of operation of the developed testing 
environment is presented.  
 
Figure 4.  Scheme of operation of SocialStegDisc 
The main client application is the SocialStegDisc Shell 
terminal, which translates the client queries to appropriate 
operations of the file directory and operations on files, using 
the Controller module. In addition, two modules known from 
StegHash [2] have been used: 
1) StegHash Engine – a module responsible for the 
creation of appropriate addressing of multimedia 
files with the use of hashtags.  
2) Database – contains a set of multimedia files used 
as a carrier of hidden data. 
B. Generation of addresses 
The basic operation of the system is generation of 
addresses. This index plays two roles:  
1) Unambiguously identifies the object, 
2) Identifies the social network in which it is 
embedded.  
In the StegHash system [2], addresses were generated by 
means of any type of permutation generation algorithm, and 
uniqueness was ensured by rejecting the already drawn 
addresses. For SocialStegDisc, generation of addresses in a 
chain must be characterized by restorability with the use of 
appropriate initial conditions. To this end, an approach of 
Rivest [12] was used, who presented a reference code for a 
program generating a random sample of s size from set S. 
Assuming that s = S, the sample is a searched permutation of 
set S. In Figure 5, an exemplary code in Python of a chain 
generation method with no dictionaries stored is presented. 
 
def	go_to_perm(seed,	counter):	
input	=	""	
for	num	in	seed:	
	 input	+=	str(num)	
i	=	0	
output_list	=	[]	
while(i	<	counter):	
	 if(len(output_list)	==	len(seed)):	
	 	 for	num	in	output_list:	
	 	 	 input	=	""	
	 	 	 input	=	str(num)	
	 	 	 output_list	=	[]	
	 i	=	i	+	1	
	 hash_input	=	input	+	str(i)	
	 hash	 =	 hashlib.sha256(hash_input.encode('utf-
8'))	
	 output	=	int(hash.hexdigest(),16)	
	 pick	=	int(output	%	len(seed))	
	 if	not	pick	in	output_list:	
	 	 output_list.append(pick)	
					return	output_list 
Figure 5.  Method of address generation based on reference address 
The main part of the method is using the hash function 
for pseudorandom generation of the next value which is a 
candidate to become an element of an output permutation. In 
the example of the code, the function SHA-256 was used 
[13], but it is possible to apply other hash functions, for 
instance SHA-512 [13]. Using a hash function with a greater 
output size reduces the number of sampling iterations when 
completing the output table. The output value from the hash 
function is converted to a hexadecimal number, based on 
which a decimal value is generated, which is a 
pseudorandom number generated in a given loop iteration. 
This number undergoes the operation of obtaining remainder 
from division by the set size. At the end, it is verified 
whether the sampled value already exists in the output set 
from a given iteration of permutation generation. If not, it 
should be added to the list. Generation ends when the table 
of numbers has been obtained of the size of a set undergoing 
permutation. The returned table of numbers is mapped to 
relevant hashtags. 
C. Hosting in social media 
When selecting a way of multimedia hosting, attention 
should be paid to multimedia files processing on the side of 
social network services and the impact this processing has on 
non-breach of hidden data. This problem was researched for, 
among others, Facebook. In [10], the authors verified various 
approaches to eliminate the compression effect and 
algorithms sanitizing steganography on the side of Facebook 
servers. Research shows that Facebook algorithms are 
efficient in detecting the steganography known so far, in 
particular for hidden information of greater size. Therefore, it 
should be verified first whether the social networks selected 
for the needs of practical implementation of SocialStegDisc 
ensure non-interference with the byte content of files.  
Problems occurring with sanitization of steganography 
on the side of social networks or with its deformation may be 
circumvented by using an intermediary layer in the form of 
file upload services. An advantage of such approach is that 
such service has no impact on the file content, and thus – 
there is a certainty of non-breach of steganographic content. 
Then, in the social service using a hashtag mechanism only a 
link and a set of hashtags addressing this file are shared. 
VI. SUMMARY 
In this work, the authors’ own concept of a new 
steganographic filesystem called SocialStegDisc was 
formulated. This system works in analogy to classic 
filesystems such as FAT or NTFS. A carrier of hidden 
information are multimedia files embedded in various open 
social networks. Every multimedia object is indexed with a 
unique permutation of a set of n hashtags. Between the 
objects there is a logical structure created by a set hashing 
function. On the basis of an input index (permutation of a set 
of hashtags), this function generates an index of the next 
object (permutation of a set of hashtags). Thus, subsequent 
blocks of hidden space may be read, recorded or modified in 
sequences, which is an analogy to servicing classic 
filesystems.    
Researching such issues as the SocialStegDisc technique 
focuses on their usefulness in real scenarios, especially with 
respect to information leak. On one hand, it may seem that 
development of such concepts may serve only terrorists or 
other criminals in their attempts to hide communication 
supporting their actions. But above all, the purpose of 
research on this method was to demonstrate its application 
options and to determine on this basis the vulnerability of the 
systems used in it. Such vulnerability may be taken into 
account at the following iterations of the system 
development and be entirely eliminated. 
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